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RECENT DECISIONS
tically every judicial report of attempted extraterritorial collection
of taxes in the United States has come from the state and federal
courts of New York... ," 30 the public interest might well be safe-
guarded by precluding enforcement of foreign tax measures. Thus,
public policy alone should be considered as the preclusionary element
against effectuating foreign tax claims.
But complete evasion by some inevitably increases the burden
of others. The ultimate solution, it is submitted, should be delegated
to the Commission on Uniform State Laws for the purpose of impro-
vising an undiversified code for the enforcement by each state of
the revenue laws of foreign states, the result of which may well be
reciprocal inter-state legislation.31 The problem as regards foreign
countries should be solved by resort to international conventions.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FEINBERG LAW - DIS-mISSAL OF
TFAcHF .- In three separate actions relief was sought to declare
Section 3022 of the Education Law enacted in 1949, commonly known
as the Feinberg Law, unconstitutional and to enjoin the Board of
Regents of the State of New York from enforcing its provisions.
Appellants contend that the Feinberg Law is incompatible with the
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution and by Section 8 of Article I of the State Constitution, that
the Feinberg Law is a bill of attainder and that, as such, it violates
Section 10 of Article I of the Federal Constitution, and that the statute
is unconstitutionally vague and lacking in procedural due process.
Held, the Feinberg Law is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State, is not an arbitrary or unreasonable restraint on civil liberties,
has none of the characteristics of a bill of attainder, is sufficiently
clear to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process, and is
therefore constitutionally unobjectionable. Thompson v. Wallin,
Ledernmn v. Board of Education, Matter of L'Homnedieu, 301 N. Y.
476, 95 N. E. 2d 806 (1950).
The preamble I to the Feinberg Law extensively states the need
3o Ibid.
31 But conventions consume energy, time and money. The most facile and
plausible method whereby every state could collect its tax claims, would be to
reduce that claim to a judgment. See note 6 mtpra.
1 Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 360, § 1. "The legislature hereby finds and de-
clares that there is common report that members of subversive groups, and
particularly of the communist party and certain of its affiliated organizations,
have infiltrated into public employment in the public schools of the state. This
has occurred and continues despite the existence of statutes designed to prevent
the appointment to or the retention in employment in public office and particu-
larly in the public schools of the state of members of any organization which
teaches or advocates that the government of the United States or of any state
or of any political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown by force or vio-
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for and the purpose of the law. The directive provisions are em-
braced in a new section of the Education Law.2  The law itself is
lence or by any unlawful means. The consequence of any such infiltration into
the public schools is that subversive propaganda can be disseminated among
children of tender years by those who teach them and to whom the children
look for guidance, authority and leadership. The legislature finds that mem-
bers of such groups frequently use their office or position to advocate and teach
subversive doctrines. The legislature finds that members of such groups are
frequently bound by oath, agreement, pledge or understanding to follow, advo-
cate and teach a prescribed party line or group dogma or doctrine without
regard to truth or free inquiry. The legislature finds that such dissemination
of propaganda may be and frequently is sufficiently subtle to escape detection
in the classroom. It is difficult, therefore, to measure the menace of such in-
filtration in the schools by conduct in the classroom. The legislature further
finds and declares that in order to protect the children in our state from such
subversive influences it is essential that the laws prohibiting persons who are
members of subversive groups, such as the communist party and its affiliated
organizations, from obtaining or retaining employment in the public schools, be
rigorously enforced. The legislature deplores the failure heretofore to prevent
such infiltration which threatens dangerously to become a commonplace in our
schools. To this end, the board of regents, which is charged primarily with
the responsibility of supervising the public school systems in the state, should
be admonished and directed to take affirmative action to meet this grave menace
and to report thereon regularly to the state legislature."
2 N. Y. EDUCATON LAw § 3022. "Elimination of subversive persons from
the public school system
"1. The board of regents shall adopt, promulgate, and enforce rules and
regulations for the disqualification or removal of superintendents of schools,
teachers or employees in the public schools in any city or school district of the
state who violate the provisions of section three thousand twenty-one of this
article, or who are ineligible for appointment to or retention in any office or
position in such public schools on any of the grounds set forth in section
twelve-a of the civil service law and shall provide therein appropriate methods
and procedure for the enforcement of such sections of this article and the civil
service law.
"2. The board of regents shall, after inquiry, and after such notice and
hearing as may be appropriate, make a listing of organizations which it finds
to be subversive in that they advocate, advise, teach or embrace the doctrine
that the government of the United States or of any state or of any political
subdivision thereof shall be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or
any unlawful means, or that they advocate, advise, teach or embrace the duty,
necessity or propriety of adopting any such doctrine, as set forth in section
twelve-a of the civil service law. Such listings may be amended and revised
from time to time. The board, in making such inquiry, may utilize any similar
listings or designations promulgated by any federal agency or authority au-
thorized by federal law, regulation or executive order, and for the purposes of
such inquiry, the board may request and receive from such federal agencies or
authorities any supporting material or evidence that may be made available
to it. The board of regents shall provide in the rules and regulations required
by subdivision one hereof that membership in any such organization included
in such listing made by it shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualifica-
tion for appointment to or retention in any office or position in the public schools
of the state.
"3. The board of regents shall annually, on or before the fifteenth day
of February, by separate report, render to the legislature, a full statement of
measures taken by it for the enforcement of such provisions of law and to
require compliance therewith. Such reports shall contain a description of
surveys made by the board of regents, from time to time, as may be appro-
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free of surplusage. It recognizes and concerns itself with a major
state problem and proceeds directly to meet the conditions found to
exist. The court in considering the grounds for constitutional attack
on the law regarded it as serving to implement the laws 3 previously
enacted which prescribed statutory standards governing the conduct
not only of teachers but of all persons employed by the state. The
law in question now provides a basis for disqualification from em-
ployment by the state in the carrying on of one of its basic functions,
namely, the education of its children.4
In passing upon the constitutionality of an act of the legislature
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
as to the wisdom or expediency of the enactment.5 The determination
of the existence of a danger to society is a practical one, based on
experience, and the courts are slow to declare that the legislature is
wrong in its conclusion.0 The New York Legislature having found
the facts and directed the law against what it deemed to be an evil
actually existing, the court in its review properly held that an in-
quiry into those facts would be beyond its field and a usurpation of
the power of the legislature. Within those limits the court then
proceeded to examine the contentions of the appellants.
The freedoms and civil rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution 7 and by Section 8 of Article I of
the New York State Constitution 8 are not absolutes.9 The police
power of a state is the least restricted of all governmental powers
and extends to all great public needs.' 0 Thus a state may never
priate, to ascertain the extent to which such provisions of law have been en-
forced in the city and school districts of the state."
3 N. Y. EDUCATON LAW § 3021. (Removal of superintendents, teachers,
and employees for treasonable or seditious acts or utterances.) N. Y. CIVIL
SERvcIC LAw § 12-a. (Any person who commits treasonable acts, publishes,
prints, edits, issues or sells any publication advocating overthrow of the gov-
ernment, or who is associated in any way with a group advocating such, shall
be ineligible for appointment to or retention in the service of the state.)
4 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. XI, § 1. "The legislature shall provide for the main-
tenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the chil-
dren of the state may be educated."
5American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950);
United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947);
Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U. S. 623 (1887).
6 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914).
7U. S. CONsT. AmNmD. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
8N. Y. Co~sT. Art. I, § 8. "Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press. .. ."
9United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75(1947); Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).20 People of New York v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
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be deprived of its primary and basic right to protect itself against
attack" since civil liberties themselves imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty
itself would be lost in the excesses of abuse of privilege.' 2 Abuse
of the privileges of freedom is therefore excepted from the protection
of the Constitution,'" and the police power may be directed against
dangers to society,14 the infringement upon civil liberties being
weighed against the seriousness of the threat to the public interest. 15
The legislature may not act arbitrarily or unreasonably,16 and there
are limits beyond which it cannot go.'1 The legislation must of ne-
cessity be directed at a clear and present danger; s in determining
the existence of this danger, however, there is no mechanical test
which can be applied, 19 the experience of mankind and the lessons
of history in relation to existing facts and circumstances being the
,bases for decision.20 Once this clear and present danger has been
found to exist, the State is not compelled to await the success of
the attack, but may then exercise its essential right of self-preservation
by taking steps to prevent the threatened injury.21 Thus a state is
not inhibited from exerting its police power to prevent its own citi-
zens from obstructing state and national purposes, 22 and statutes
aiming to conform law to accepted community standards, even though
infringing slightly upon civil liberties, are not to be struck down
unless they are clearly unconstitutional,23 but rather must be lib-
erally construed so as to avoid doubtful constitutional questions 24
to the extent that the statute is essential to the attainment of the end
in view.2 5  The state having the right to reasonably regulate the
conduct of its citizens clearly possesses the right to regulate the
conduct of its employees, especially when the interest which the state
is seeking to protect is one of such vital importance as the safe-
guarding of its children from subversive influence.
11 Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
12 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
13 People of New York v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902).
14 People of New York v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
15 American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).16United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75 (1947); Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
17 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887).18 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). See United States v.
Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) for recent discussion of the clear and
present danger concept.19 American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).
20 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914) ; Hawker v. New York,
170 U. S. 189 (1898).21 American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).22 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920).
23 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927); People of New York v.
Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
24  ox . Washington, 236 U. S . 273 (1915).
25 People of New York v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
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It has been held that legislation which has as its purpose the
promotion of efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties
and the maintenance of discipline in public service is constitutionally
valid. 26 And in considering Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act 27 the
Supreme Court held that Congress has the right, within reasonable
limits, to regulate the political conduct of federal employees, and
that when acts of employees menace integrity and competency, leg-
islation is permissible to forestall the danger.28 In such a case, the
court must balance the guarantees of freedom against congressional
acts designed to protect a democratic society.29 Employment by the
state in the carrying on of its constitutional functions is a matter of
privilege, not a matter of right, and is therefore subject to the im-
position of reasonable conditions by the state. This is best borne
out by the words of Justice Holmes that "The petitioner may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." 30
"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punish-
ment without a judicial trial." a" Therefore, in order to strike down
any enactment as a bill of attainder it must be found that it does in
fact impose a penalty without a hearing. The reference made in the
preamble of the Feinberg Law 3 2 to the Communist Party cannot be
deemed to constitute a legislative determination of guilt because it
is well settled that the preamble to a statute is not part of it and
enacts nothing.83 Furthermore, the provision of the act authorizing
the listing of organizations found to be subversive 8 4 expressly pro-
vides for notice and a full hearing before such determination and
listing31 ; No punishment is inflicted upon any organization listed
pursuant to the law, such organizations remaining as free to function
after as before the determination of the Board of Regents. Inasmuch
as examination of the law discloses none of the essential elements of
a bill of attainder, neither imposing punishment nor determining guilt
by legislative act, it is submitted that the court correctly dismissed
this contention.
The use of past conduct as a foundation for *determination as
to what future conduct will be does not negative the conclusion that
an act is aimed to prevent future harm rather than to punish past
26 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 (1930); Ex parte Curtis, 106
U. S. 371 (1882).
27 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 54 STAT. 767, 18 U. S. C. § 61h (1940).
28 United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75
(1947).
29 Ibid.
30 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892).31 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (U. S. 1866).
32 Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 360, § 1.
33 Pumpelly v. Village of Owego, 45 How. Prac. 219 (N. Y. 1863).
34 N. Y. EDUcATIoN LAw § 3022.35 Ibid.
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action.86 Loyalty and patriotism are sometimes as important qual-
ifications for a teacher as knowledge, and it is within the province
of the legislative branch to prescribe what evidence of qualification
shall be furnished.37 In American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v.
Douds the Court stated ". . . they are subject to possible loss of
position only because there is substantial ground for the congressional
judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed intofuture conduct." 38 In a leading New York case it was held that
"The presumption growing out of a prima facie case, however, remains
only so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary. When
that is offered the presumption disappears, and unless met by fur-
ther proof there is nothing to justify a finding based solely upon
it." ss In the light of these authorities and the fact that there is
provision in the law 40 for judicial review of any order of ineligibility
for a teaching position, it cannot be said that there is any lack of
procedural due process in the directive clauses of the law in question.41
The novelty of the Feinberg Law may not be used as a basis
of constitutional objection. 42 In view of the legislative determination
of facts and circumstances constituting a menace to society, and the
nature and language of the provisions of the Feinberg Law, it is
submitted that the conclusion reached by the court is in accord with
the weight of authority and is a reassertion of the state's right to use
the police power to protect itself from internal threat.
)X
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY DURING PROCEEDINGs-GRouNDS
FOR NEW TRIAL.-A defendant was convicted of murder in the first
degree. There was nothing in his demeanor during trial to suggest
to the court or to any layman that he was incapable of understanding
the proceedings or making a rational defense. When the verdict
of guilty was announced the defendant harangued the court claim-
ing to be the "messiah". Upon motion, he was taken to a hospital
for observation, and adjudged as presently insane. Defendant was
then removed to a state institution for the criminal insane. Five
years later, having regained his sanity,' he was sentenced to death.
The following day, a motion was made for a new trial on the ground
3 6 American Communications Assn., C-I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).
3 7 Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898).
38American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 413
(1950).3 9 Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 433, 116 N. E. 78, 79 (1917).4 0 N. Y. Civi. SERvicE LAW § 12-a, subd. d.
41 N. Y. EDucATioN LAW § 3022.
42 People of New York v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
1 People v. Wolfe, 198 Misc. 695 (County Ct 1950).
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